Joe's Investo-Blog

http://pragcap.com/those-who-ignore-history

by The Pragmatic Capitalist (pragcap.com)

My position over the last 2 years has been as follows: this is a Main Street debt crisis. I have been highly critical of the government’s incessant interventionist policies over the last few years largely because they ignore the actual problems at hand. First it was Mr. Bernanke saving the banks because he believed the credit crisis started with the banking sector. The great monetarist gaffe ensued. Tim Geithner piled on with the PPIP. FASB jumped on board the bank rescue plan by altering the accounting rules. And then the icing on the cake was the Recovery Act, which, in my opinion, just shoveled money into the hole that had become the output gap, without actually trying to target the real cause of the crisis – those burdened by the debt. In essence, the various bailouts primarily targeted everyone except the people who really needed it.
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Asset Allocation, Banks, Economics, Financial Crises, Growth Asset Allocation, debt, deleveraging, Economics, economy, EU, fiscal policy, history, strategy, The Administration, US treasury

by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/7857595/RBS-tells-clients-to-prepare-for-monster-money-printing-by-the-Federal-Reserve.html

Entitled “Deflation: Making Sure It Doesn’t Happen Here”, it is a warfare manual for defeating economic slumps by use of extreme monetary stimulus once interest rates have dropped to zero, and implicitly once governments have spent themselves to near bankruptcy.

The speech is best known for its irreverent one-liner: “The US government has a technology, called a printing press, that allows it to produce as many US dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost.”

Bernanke began putting the script into action after the credit system seized up in 2008, purchasing $1.75 trillion of Treasuries, mortgage securities, and agency bonds to shore up the US credit system. He stopped far short of the $5 trillion balance sheet quietly pencilled in by the Fed Board as the upper limit for quantitative easing (QE).

Investors basking in Wall Street’s V-shaped rally had assumed that this bizarre episode was over. So did the Fed, which has been shutting liquidity spigots one by one. But the latest batch of data is disturbing.
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Asset Allocation, Economics, Financial Crises, Inflation/Deflation Banks, collapse, debt, Economics, economy, fiscal policy, history, inflation, monetary policy, The Administration, The Fed

By Paul Krugman
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/opinion/28krugman.html

Recessions are common; depressions are rare. As far as I can tell, there were only two eras in economic history that were widely described as “depressions” at the time: the years of deflation and instability that followed the Panic of 1873 and the years of mass unemployment that followed the financial crisis of 1929-31.

Neither the Long Depression of the 19th century nor the Great Depression of the 20th was an era of nonstop decline — on the contrary, both included periods when the economy grew. But these episodes of improvement were never enough to undo the damage from the initial slump, and were followed by relapses.

We are now, I fear, in the early stages of a third depression. It will probably look more like the Long Depression than the much more severe Great Depression. But the cost — to the world economy and, above all, to the millions of lives blighted by the absence of jobs — will nonetheless be immense.

And this third depression will be primarily a failure of policy. Around the world — most recently at last weekend’s deeply discouraging G-20 meeting — governments are obsessing about inflation when the real threat is deflation, preaching the need for belt-tightening when the real problem is inadequate spending.
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Asset Allocation, Economics, Financial Crises, Inflation/Deflation, Markets Banks, collapse, congress, debt, deflation, Economics, economy, EU, fiscal policy, history, IMF, monetary policy, strategy, taxes, The Administration, The Fed

by James Galbraith
May 12, 2010

source: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/05/galbraith_the_danger_posed_by.html

James Galbraith is an economist and the Lloyd M. Bentsen Jr. chair in government and business relations at the University of Texas at Austin. He’s also a skeptic of the prevailing concern over America’s long-term deficit. With many people now comparing America’s fiscal condition to Greece, I spoke with Galbraith to get the other side of the argument. An edited transcript of our conversation follows.

EK: You think the danger posed by the long-term deficit is overstated by most economists and economic commentators.

JG: No, I think the danger is zero. It’s not overstated. It’s completely misstated.

EK: Why?

JG: What is the nature of the danger? The only possible answer is that this larger deficit would cause a rise in the interest rate. Well, if the markets thought that was a serious risk, the rate on 20-year treasury bonds wouldn’t be 4 percent and change now. If the markets thought that the interest rate would be forced up by funding difficulties 10 year from now, it would show up in the 20-year rate. That rate has actually been coming down in the wake of the European crisis.

So there are two possibilities here. One is the theory is wrong. The other is that the market isn’t rational. And if the market isn’t rational, there’s no point in designing policy to accommodate the markets because you can’t accommodate an irrational entity.
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Banks, Bonds, Currencies, Economics, Inflation/Deflation Banks, Bonds, congress, Currencies, debt, deflation, Economics, EU, exchange rates, fiscal policy, IMF, inflation, monetary policy, Politics, The Administration, US treasury

• Force Credit Default Swaps onto Transparent Exchanges
• “Too Big to Fail” Must Go
• Excessive Leverage Must Go
• Separate Commercial and Investment Banking – Again

Read the entire John Mauldin article here: http://www.frontlinethoughts.com/article.asp?id=mwo040910

Credit Default Swaps

What happened in the last credit crisis was that interlocking credit default swaps among so many banks made the ENTIRE system too big to fail. AIG basically sold naked options in the form of credit default swaps to all. Yet nothing has changed. We again have credit default swaps (CDS) growing, and no one knows who could be overextended. Once again, everyone could be dependent on everybody else, and we have no idea if there is a Bear, Lehman, or AIG in these woods. CDS’s are good things, just like futures. But they must go to a transparent exchange. There needs to be position limits, just as there are in futures and commodities. There needs to be very transparent pricing and commissions. And someone needs to monitor who owns them and what risks they are taking.

Too Big to Fail Must Go
We have large banks that take massive risks, which allow them to pay huge bonuses to management and traders; and then if they have problems the taxpayer has to take the losses. We can see why the banks like it. The problem is that parts of these large banks are essentially hedge funds, working with cheap commercial deposit money and putting the entire bank at risk. As taxpayers, we don’t want to be taking the risk so some big bank can have a trading desk and make large profits that only benefit their shareholders and management, where we have to pick up the pieces with our tax dollars when they fail. Separate traditional banking and investment banks. Commercial banks should be boring, traditional lending to customers, services, etc.

Excessive Leverage Must Go
The problem of too big to fail is ultimately one of leverage. If a small bank fails, no one really notices. If a giant bank fails and puts the system at risk, it costs us a lot. We must reduce the allowable leverage the larger a bank gets? This would clearly reduce their risk and encourage them to only make prudent bets (otherwise known as loans), as their risk capital would be limited. If they wanted to make more loans, then they could raise more capital or retain more earnings. Would that hurt earnings and shareholders and limit share prices? Yes, but the world of privatizing the gains and socializing the risks must become a thing of the past.

Banks, Economics, Financial Crises, Markets, Politics Banks, collapse, congress, debt, economy, Politics, Regulators, The Administration

What the Peoples Bank of China Can and Cannot do with its Foreign Currency Reserves

http://mpettis.com/2010/02/what-the-pboc-cannot-do-with-its-reserves/

February 22nd, 2010 by Michael Pettis

China did not reduce its dollar holdings
Beijing is not Washington’s banker
Can PBoC reserves protect China?
Balance sheet mismatches
Are there no winners and losers?
Wealth is transferred within China

It is a real toss-up as to which generates more bizarre comment in the international press: Beijing’s long-feared dumping of US Treasuries, or the use and value of the PBoC’s central bank reserves. The revelation last week that Chinese holdings of US Treasury obligations fell in December by $34.2 billion, to $755.4 billion, generated a frisson of fear and excitement, leading one prominent newspaper to worry that “If there is one thing that gets investors twitchy, it is the fear that China is losing its appetite for US government bonds.”

And shouldn’t they get twitchy? After all this reduction in Chinese holdings of Treasury bonds comes from the USG’s TIC data, so it must be true that China is dumping dollars, right?

No need to twitch, it means no such thing. Read more…

Banks, Bonds, Currencies, Economics, Financial Crises Banks, Bonds, collapse, Currencies, debt, Economics, exchange rates, fiscal policy, inflation, monetary policy, The Administration, The Fed, trade

Here’s a guy who finally understands his job. Let’s see if Pres. Obama understands his and get’s behind this guy. It still remains to be seen if the banks really do own Congress and are able to derail this upstart.

CFTC’s Gensler Turns Back on Wall Street to Push Derivatives Overhaul

By Ian Katz and Robert Schmidt
Bloomberg News
Friday, February 12, 2010

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=a3OkrdITAZtA&pos=10

WASHINGTON — Gary Gensler, chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, is shattering any illusions that his 18 years at Goldman Sachs Group Inc. would make him sympathetic to Wall Street’s effort to weaken derivatives legislation.

Over a private lunch at the Waldorf Astoria hotel on Jan. 6, Gensler, 52, told bank executives that while he once shared their goals — to boost revenue and increase their bonuses — his responsibility now was to American taxpayers. And if he gets his way, Gensler said, their firms will be less profitable, according to three people familiar with the discussion.

Attending the lunch were David B. Heller, co-head of the securities division at Goldman Sachs; Seth Waugh, chief executive officer of Deutsche Bank Americas; Timothy O’Hara, head of global credit at Credit Suisse Holdings USA Inc., and Robert P. Kelly, CEO of Bank of New York Mellon Corp. When one banker asked Gensler what he sees as the biggest obstacles to reform, he gestured toward his hosts and replied, “You.”

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Banks, Financial Crises, Politics Banks, collapse, Politics, Regulators, The Administration